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GENDER STEREOTYPING: EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES
OF TITLE VII: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2006 ANNUAL
MEETING, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS,
SECTION ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
Michelle A. Travis*: Welcome to our panel on, "Gender
Stereotyping: Expanding the Boundaries of Title VII." I am Michelle
Travis from the University of San Francisco School of Law. I am also
the incoming Chair of the AALS Section on Employment
Discrimination Law, which organized this panel. I would like to thank
the outgoing Chair, Miranda McGowan from the University of San
Diego School of Law, and our Executive Committee members,
Melissa Hart from the University of Colorado School of Law,
Sharona Hoffman from Case Western Reserve University School of
Law, and Paul Secunda from the University of Mississippi School of
Law, for their help in organizing this event.
This panel will be exploring the use of gender stereotyping
theory under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' Those of us
involved in employment discrimination law are certainly familiar with
the prototypic use of gender stereotyping to prove discriminatory
intent in the United States Supreme Court case of Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins2 in 1989. In Price Waterhouse, Ms. Hopkins failed to make
partner at an accounting firm because, according to her superiors, she
needed to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled,... wear jewelry,"
and "take a course at charm school."' The Court held that by
objecting to aggressiveness only in women, the employer had engaged
in gender stereotyping, which was evidence that sex played an
impermissible motivating role in the employer's decision-making
4process.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law, and Incoming
Chair of the AALS Section on Employment Discrimination Law.
1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (2000)).
2. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
3. Id. at 235 (internal quotations omitted).
4. Id. at 251-52.
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Although Price Waterhouse addressed only the specific example
of a feminine-female stereotype, the Court spoke in potentially broad
terms. "As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping," stated the
Court, "we are beyond the day when an employer [may] evaluate
employees by assuming or insisting that they match[] the stereotype
associated with their group." "[I]n forbidding employers to
discriminate against individuals because of their sex," the Court
explained, "Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex
stereotypes."6
Building on this broad language, employees recently have had
some notable litigation success using the concept of gender
stereotyping to prove discriminatory intent in contexts other than
those involving the prototypic feminine-female stereotype that was at
issue in Price Waterhouse. It is those recent developments that we
will explore today. These new cases raise a number of interesting
issues, including: how the content and use of gender stereotyping
theory has changed over time; whether gender stereotyping theory
can be used as a way to protect classes of workers not originally
thought (or intended) to be protected by Title VII, and if so, whether
that is a positive or negative development; what role social science
has to play in developing gender stereotyping evidence and proof; the
potential role of gender stereotyping theory in Title VII class action
suits; and more generally, what is the potential reach and what are the
potential limits of gender stereotyping as a method of proving
discrimination "because of ... sex"' in the workplace.
Our first two speakers will discuss the evolving case law in two
new areas of Title VII litigation in which employees have used sex
stereotyping to prove discrimination. Our first speaker will be
Professor Arthur Leonard from New York Law School. Professor
Leonard writes extensively in the areas of employment law, sexual
orientation law, and AIDS law. He recently received the Dan Bradley
Lifetime Achievement Award from the National Lesbian and Gay
Law Association in recognition of his contributions to the
advancement of LGBT legal rights. Professor Leonard will be
speaking on gender stereotyping and sexual minorities. He will focus
particularly on recent gender nonconformity cases involving
5. Id. at 251.
6. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
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employees who are transgendered, gay, or perceived to be gay.
Our second speaker will be Professor Joan Williams from the
University of California Hastings College of the Law. Professor
Williams is an expert on work/family issues, and she is the founding
director of the Center for WorkLife Law, which is a research and
advocacy center focused on affecting the public dialogue about
changing families and their workplace experiences. Professor
Williams will be speaking on gender stereotyping and family
caregiving responsibilities. In particular, she will focus on recent
cases in which female employees successfully have litigated Title VII
claims by demonstrating employers' reliance on stereotypes of
mothers.
Our final speaker will expand our dialogue beyond the case law
to a broader discussion of stereotyping: what it means to stereotype,
the actual content of stereotypes, and how stereotypes have evolved
(or not) over time. That speaker is Professor Miriam Cherry, who is
from Samford University, the Cumberland School of Law, and who
currently is visiting at Hofstra University School of Law. Professor
Cherry is an expert in employment law, law and literature, and
feminist jurisprudence. She will help us move from a discussion of
recent case law to broader issues of sex stereotyping by looking
particularly at stereotyping of women workers in film.
Arthur S. Leonard*: Good morning. In 1978, in City of Los
Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart, the U.S. Supreme
Court said, "It is now well recognized that employment decisions
cannot be predicated on mere stereotyped impressions about the
characteristics of males or females."9 The Court found unlawful
differential treatment of men and women under a municipal
employee pension plan that was based on the statistical artifact that
women, on average, live longer than men. In 1989, as you heard, in
Price Waterhouse,0 the Supreme Court took the stereotype concept
further, holding that denying an accounting firm partnership to a
candidate whose appearance and behavior were deemed
inappropriate for "a lady partner" was unlawful because it was
evidence of stereotyped thinking about women and gender roles.
Because women were disadvantaged if they behaved in a manner
* Professor of Law, New York Law School.
8. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
9. Id. at 707.
10. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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deemed suitable for men, sex discrimination was taking place. A
different standard was imposed depending on the sex of the
individual.
Notably, the Supreme Court used the word "gender" in Price
Waterhouse to describe the prohibited basis of discrimination under
the statute," a word that does not itself appear in the operative
statutory provision. How far might this concept of sex stereotyping or
gender stereotyping reach under Title VII in cases brought by sexual
minorities, by whom I mean lesbians, gay men, bisexuals and
transgender persons? One might posit right off that lesbians, gay
men, bisexuals and transgender persons as a group fail to conform to
various stereotypes that society holds as to the "normal" mode of
behavior for men and women. Lesbians, gay men and bisexuals failed
to conform to gender norms through their choice of sexual partners.
Transgender persons may or may not fail to conform in that manner,
but they fail to conform in ways similar to, but rather more
pronounced than, Ann Hopkins in the Price Waterhouse case.
That being so, if it can be shown that an individual's failure to
conform to societally-expected gender roles has caused that
individual to be denied a job, subjected to workplace harassment,
denied promotions or desirable assignments or discharged, can those
actions be challenged under Title VII as sex discrimination? And
could one make a case that all gay men, lesbians, bisexuals and
transgender people who encounter discrimination because of their
sexual orientation or gender identity or expression should be
protected on that basis, on the theory that it is all gender-based
discrimination due at least in part to sex stereotyping?
It would be tempting to embrace such a conclusion were not the
history of forty years of jurisprudence under Title VII so strongly
otherwise. Sexual minorities have been seeking such protection for
more than forty years with little success prior to the 1990s, except in
the very limited category of quid pro quo sexual harassment cases,
where some gay employees who were subjected to sexual
propositioning by supervisors were able to benefit from the
inescapable fact that they were singled out because of their sex. 2
Before Price Waterhouse, however, the lower federal courts had
11. Id. at 240.
12. See, e.g., Joyner v. AAA Cooper Trans., 597 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala. 1983), affd mem.,
749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984). See generally ARTHUR LEONARD, SEXUALITY AND THE LAW
427-29 (1993) (discussing cases in detail).
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completely rejected the notion that discrimination due to gender non-
conformity as such was actionable sex discrimination." An early
example is Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,14 a 1978 Fifth
Circuit decision. Benny Smith, an African American man, was
rejected for a mail clerk position because he was considered too
"effeminate." Smith filed what was in essence a sex stereotyping
claim. Liberty Mutual argued that this was controlled by a recent
Fifth Circuit decision," holding that employers could have different
grooming standards for men and women. The trial court agreed,
stating that what would be discriminatory would be to impose the
same mode of dress or behavior on all employees, regardless of their
sex." Although Smith's sexual orientation is not specified in the
court's opinion, the trial judge jumped to the conclusion that Smith
must have been gay and pointedly observed that Title VII did not
prohibit sexual orientation discrimination." On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit treated this as a sexual orientation discrimination case and
cited, in support of affirmance, an EEOC decision that Title VII does
not cover sexual orientation discrimination, and two district court
decisions that had dismissed Title VII claims by transsexual
plaintiffs.19
A year later, the Ninth Circuit decided the case that came to
represent the entire issue of anti-gay workplace discrimination in
most employment discrimination casebooks until quite recently,
DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co.20 One of the
plaintiffs was Donald Straley, a teacher at the Happy Times Nursery
School, who was fired when he returned from summer vacation
wearing a small golden ear loop. His supervisor assumed that only gay
men wore jewelry on their ears. The trial court dealt with Straley's
suit as a sexual orientation discrimination claim and dismissed it as
non-actionable under Title VII. It was consolidated on appeal with
13. See, e.g., Longo v. Carlisle De Coppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1976), Earwood v.
Continental Southeastern Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir., 1976), Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co.,
527 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1975).
14. 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978).
15. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
16. Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp. 1098, 1101 (D.C. Ga. 1975).
17. The case is discussed in detail in LEONARD, supra note 12, at 402-06.
18. EEOC Dec. 76-75, Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 6495 (1976).
19. Powell v. Read's Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369 (D. Md. 1977); Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Med.
Ctr., 403 F. Supp. 456 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
20. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979). The case is discussed in detail in LEONARD, supra note
12, at 406-09.
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Title VII sex discrimination claims by several gay former employees
of Pacific Telephone. The Ninth Circuit's opinion, rejecting their
cases, focused on the sexual orientation issue. Although Straley
argued that he was really bringing a sex stereotyping claim, the court
cited Smith v. Liberty Mutual and rejected the claim without much in
the way of analysis.2 1
Without any significant substantive discussion, the Seventh and
Eighth Circuits rejected Title VII claims by transsexual plaintiffs in
the early 1980s, in Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc. ,22 and Ulane v.
Eastern Airlines.23 Neither of those courts was willing to entertain the
idea that these two gender nonconforming individuals were
presenting actionable sex stereotyping claims. Rather, the opinions
asserted that, in the absence of enlightening legislative history,
Congress' decision to add sex to the civil rights bill in 1964 should be
narrowly and literally construed on the most simplistic level to mean
discrimination between men and women, with no room for arguments
about sexual identity, to use the term employed by Karen Ulane in
her complaint.
It took a while after the plurality decision by the Supreme Court
in Price Waterhouse for the message to spread to the lower federal
courts that the concept of sex under Title VII could be viewed more
broadly. Two lines of cases involving sexual minorities have built
heavily on the Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse case. One line involves
the exploding field of workplace harassment law and the claims of
men who are either gay or perceived as being gay to protection under
Title VII against hostile environment harassment as a form of sex
discrimination. 24 The other line involves transsexuals either denied
hiring or discharged.25 In both lines of cases, the concept of sex
stereotyping has emerged to generate new areas of Title VII
protection while raising questions about the legitimate uses of the
1964 statute.
When Title VII was being debated in 1964, it is likely that very
few, if any, members of the House of Representatives thought that by
21. Id. at 329-30.
22. 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982); see also Sommers v. Iowa Civ. Rts. Comm'n, 337 N.W.2d
470 (Iowa 1983). This case is discussed in detail in LEONARD, supra note 12, at 422-25.
23. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984). This case is discussed in detail in LEONARD, supra note
12, at 431-37.
24. See, e.g., King v. Super Serv. Inc., 68 Fed. Appx. 659 (3rd Cir. 2003); Hamm v.
Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058 (7th Cir. 2003).
25. See, e.g, Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004): Johnson v. Fresh Mark,
Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996 (N.D. Ohio 2003).
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voting to amend the bill to add sex, they were creating a cause of
action for transsexuals or homosexuals. Although the first organized
agitation for gay rights in the United States had already been
underway for more than a decade at that time, it had made little
impression on the public consciousness by 1964. It was not until 1969,
when the so-called Stonewall Riots occurred in New York City and a
newly militant gay rights movement emerged, that the general public
and elected officials began to notice this issue. And it was not until
the 1970s that the first proposals for legislation were filed in
Congress. They enjoyed little support and much hostility.
The idea of including gender identity together with sexual
orientation in legislative proposals did not begin to gain traction until
the 1990s, and it was then heavily resisted by the gay rights
movement. Even today, the Employment Non-Discrimination Bill
pending in both houses of Congress does not address gender identity
- just sexual orientation.26 Although several leading gay rights
organizations have now come around to endorsing the addition of
gender identity, no member of Congress has been willing to sponsor
such an amendment. So, it is simply implausible to suggest that
Congress intended to prohibit sexual orientation or gender identity
discrimination in 1964.
On the other hand, the law of sex discrimination has developed
beyond what the legislatures might have intended in 1964, sometimes
by decisions that provoke amendments to the statute, such as the
Supreme Court's pregnancy discrimination ruling,27 and sometimes by
accepting new theories of sex discrimination, such as the Supreme
Court's first sexual harassment rulings in Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson.28 No less a conservative on the Court than Justice Scalia,
writing for the unanimous Court in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc.,29 in 1998, rejected the argument that Title VII could not
apply to an instance of harassment of a man in an all-male workplace.
He said,
We see no justification in the statutory language or our precedents
for a categorical rule excluding same sex harassment claims from
the coverage of Title VII. As some courts have observed, male-on-
26. See S. 1705, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced Oct. 2, 2003).
27. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), leading to enactment of Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-55, 92 Stat. 2076, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(2000) (adding to Title VII new section 701(k) to bring discrimination on account of pregnancy
within the coverage of sex discrimination under Title VII).
28. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
29. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
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male sexual harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the
principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title
VII, but statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to
cover reasonably comparable evils and it is ultimately the
provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our
legislatures by which we are governed.30
In the Oncale case, the Court reviewed a Fifth Circuit decision3 '
applying the settled precedent in that circuit that male-on-male sexual
harassment was not actionable under Title VII because Congress was
primarily concerned with workplace discrimination against women
when it added sex to the bill. The Fifth Circuit's approach was an
outlier at the time; none of the other circuits had categorically ruled
out such cases under Title VII. But there was a diversity of
approaches. Some, alluding to Price Waterhouse, found a theoretical
basis for entertaining sex discrimination claims from men who were
subjected to severe workplace harassment and ridicule because they
were deemed insufficiently masculine.3 2 Others, most notably the
Fourth Circuit, restricted Title VII to cases where the hostile
environment stemmed from a gay supervisor harassing an employee,
usually male, directing unwanted sexual attentions.33 The Fourth
Circuit's theory was that this was sex discrimination because a gay
male supervisor would not be directing unwanted sexual attention to
female employees, only male employees, thus resulting in differential
treatment based on sex. Such reasoning led to the absurd bisexual (or
"equal opportunity") harasser defense, recognized by some courts,34
in which the employer could escape liability if it were shown that the
offending employee engaged in sexually harassing conduct without
discrimination between men and women.
The Supreme Court's Oncale decision left many unanswered
questions. The Court narrowly focused on reversing the Fifth
Circuit's categorical rule and then stated, rather cryptically, that
sexual harassment in the workplace that was severe and pervasive was
actionable if the victim was selected for such treatment because of his
or her sex." But the Court did not provide any real enlightenment
about what because of sex might mean. The Supreme Court's
30. Id. at 79.
31. 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996).
32. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997).
33. McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996); see
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996).
34. Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2000).
35. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81.
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intentions remain unknown because it has denied certiorari in court
of appeals decisions from both lines of cases that I've mentioned.6
Maybe the Court finds it premature to intervene until there is a larger
body of diverse circuit case law to resolve.
At this point, beginning before Oncale and continuing to the
present, there is authority in many of the circuits for applying Title
VII to cases where employees claim that they were subjected to
harassment due to the discomfort or anger of fellow employees
because of the plaintiff's gender non-conformity.3 7 These cases are
easily lost during pretrial motion practice, however, depending on the
harasser's terminology, the wording of the complaint, or witnesses'
statements, including the plaintiff's, in depositions. If the plaintiff is
openly gay or lesbian and the harasser's language reflects that, the
case is usually lost because the courts continue to say they are bound
by early determinations that sexual orientation discrimination is not
actionable, but not always. If the harasser's language makes clear
that the plaintiff's inadequately masculine presentation - and these
cases almost always involve male plaintiffs - and inadequately
masculine behavior is what provoked the harassment, some courts
may decide that it is sex stereotyping rather then sexual orientation
discrimination. In other words, judges walk a fine line between
acknowledging that gay employees may be subjected to sex
discrimination, not sexual orientation discrimination, when it is their
appearance and behavior and not necessarily their sexual identity that
is the focus of unfavorable attention.
The problem, of course, is that not infrequently the very
behavior that causes coworkers to consider a particular employee to
be gay and to direct ridicule and other forms of harassment using
overtly homophobic language leads the court to conclude that the
evidence shows sexual orientation discrimination. Although some
courts purport to see a clear distinction between sexual orientation
discrimination and sex stereotyping, I think such clarity is spurious,
and many of these cases turn on the happenstance of language chosen
by the harassers, or even the plaintiff.
36. See Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct.
624 (2005) (transgender discrimination case); City of Cincinnati v. Barnes, 126 S. Ct. 624 (2005),
denying cert. in Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005) (involving a pre-
operative male to female transsexual police officer who was demoted); Rene v. MGM Grand
Hotel, 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 922 (2003) (gender
stereotyping harassment case) (involving an openly gay casino employee alleging harassment).
37. See, e.g., Rene, 305 F.3d at 1061 and cases listed therein.
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Not surprisingly, the Ninth Circuit is where a lot of the action has
been, and the key case, which the Supreme Court refused to review, is
Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel," a 2002 decision that split an en banc
panel three ways.
Medina Rene is a gay man. He was assigned to an all-male
service crew on an exclusive floor of the hotel. He was subjected to
unmerciful harassment by his coworkers, some of it verbal, some of it
physical. He sued for sex discrimination. At his deposition, when
asked why he was subjected to harassment, he said it was because he
was gay. MGM then successfully moved to dismiss on the ground
that anti-gay harassment is not unlawful, a result sustained by a Ninth
Circuit panel,39 but reversed en banc. One group of judges focused on
the sexual nature of the harassment to conclude that this was sex
discrimination.40  Another focused on Rene's statements in his
deposition that he was treated by the other men as if he were a
woman and subjected to feminizing, derogatory comments. 4 1 Both of
those groups stressed that Title VII bans sex discrimination,
regardless of the sexual orientation of the victim. So, Mr. Rene's
deposition answer, that he was gay, was not dispositive. The
dissenters argued that this was clearly anti-gay discrimination, not
covered by Title VII, and disputed the plurality's characterization of
some of Mr. Rene's testimony.42
The Supreme Court's refusal to review this case leaves things in
quite a muddle, at least in the Ninth Circuit, since there was no
majority opinion for the en banc panel. No less astute an observer
than Judge Richard Posner, of the Seventh Circuit, has questioned
the burgeoning line of sex stereotyping cases involving workplace
harassment claims, in a concurring opinion in Hamm v. Weyauwega
Milk Products Inc.,43 a 2003 decision. Michael Hamm, self-described
as a heterosexual man, was called "gay," "faggot," and "girl scout" by
coworkers." There is no indication in the opinion that he was
effeminate, but there was plenty of evidence that this was an all-male
workplace in which there was lots of horseplay and name calling, in
which coworkers thought that Hamm was not a competent worker
38. Id.
39. 243 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2001).
40. Rene, 305 F.3d at 1061 (Fletcher, J., plurality opinion).
41. Id. at 1068-69 (Pregerson, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 1070 (Hug, J., dissenting).
43. 332 F.3d 1058 (7th Cir. 2003).
44. Id. at 1060.
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and mistreated him mainly for that reason, as well as for their
misperception that he might be gay, mainly because of the close
friendship he developed with a young male coworker. Concurring in
the court's conclusion that Hamm had not stated a claim under Title
VII, Judge Posner found no quarrel with the court's summary of the
case law. But, he said, "I think it worth recording my conviction that
the case law has gone off the tracks in the matter of sex stereotyping
and if it got back on this case could be decided on a simpler and more
intuitive ground and one that would reduce future litigation."45
Maybe a part of the problem is a possible misinterpretation or
misperception by the Seventh Circuit about the case law that has
developed in other circuits, because Posner asserted that the sex
stereotyping theory has been used to protect effeminate heterosexual
men, but not effeminate gay men, which seems contrary to the
reasoning of some other cases. Posner said that in examining an all-
male workplace, an effeminate man who suffers discrimination is not
suffering from sex discrimination, but rather discrimination on the
basis of effeminacy. In the absence of women in the workplace, he
said, the employer cannot be said to be discriminating against an
effeminate male employee because he is a man and thus is not
discriminating because of sex.46 If this analysis is rejected, said Posner,
the observed conclusion follows that the law protects effeminate men
from employment discrimination, but only if they are or are believed
to be heterosexuals. He went on to say:
To impute such a distinction to the authors of Title VII is to indulge
in a most extravagant legal fiction. It is also to saddle the courts
with the making of distinctions that are beyond the practical
capacity of the litigation process. Hostility to effeminate men and
to homosexual men, or to masculine women and lesbians, will often
be indistinguishable as a practical matter, especially the former.
Effeminate men are often disliked by other men because they are
suspected of being homosexual (although the opposite is also true -
effeminate homosexual men may be disliked by heterosexual men
because they're effeminate, rather than because they are
homosexual), while mannish women are disliked by some men
because they are suspected of being lesbians, and by other men
merely because they are not attracted to those men: A further
complication is that men are more hostile to male homosexuality
than they are to lesbianism. To suppose courts capable of
disentangling the motive for disliking the non-stereotypical man or
45. Id. at 1066 (Posner, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 1067 (Posner, J., concurring).
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woman is a fantasy.47
Judge Posner rejected the idea that sex stereotyping is itself a
form of sex discrimination and, in this, I think he is being faithful to
the original use of the concept in Price Waterhouse. It is, in light of all
the circumstances, relevant evidence of unlawful motivation in that
case because it shows that certain decision makers at Price
Waterhouse were imposing a different partnership standard on
women than on men. Thus, some of the case law, although it reaches
an end result that may seem desirable on policy grounds in providing
Title VII protection to individuals who have suffered terrible
oppression in the workplace, is really inappropriate as a matter of
statutory interpretation because it stretches to the breaking point the
idea of discrimination "because of sex," as a result of Congress'
failure either to pass a dedicated workplace harassment statute or to
enact a law banning sexual orientation discrimination in the
workplace.
The other line of cases, potentially just as controversial, which so
far has failed to interest the Supreme Court, is the transsexual line
that I mentioned. In 2004, the Sixth Circuit decided Smith v. City of
Salem, Ohio," a Title VII sex discrimination claim brought by a fire
fighter who was discharged after disclosing his transsexual identity
and his intent to transition from male to female. Noting that both the
Ninth 49 and First Circuits,o in cases arising under other federal
statutes dealing with sex discrimination, had found that transsexuals
present a clear case of sex discrimination due to gender
nonconformity, the Sixth Circuit panel ruled that failure to extend
Title VII protection to Smith would be inconsistent with Price
Waterhouse. After Price Waterhouse, wrote the court,
an employer who discriminates against women because, for
instance, they do not wear dresses or makeup is engaging in sex
discrimination because the discrimination would not occur but for
the victim's sex. It follows that employers who discriminate against
men because they do wear dresses and makeup, or otherwise act
femininely, are also engaging in sex discrimination because the
discrimination would not occur but for the victim's sex.
47. Id.
48. 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
49. See Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000) (Violence Against Women
Act).
50. See Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000) (Equal Credit
Opportunity Act).
51. Smith, 378 F.3d at 574.
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The court went on to say that the extensive list of federal decisions
rejecting discrimination claims by transsexuals was inconsistent with
the new line of sex stereotyping harassment cases that had developed
over the past decade and asserted that Price Waterhouse did not
provide any reason to exclude Title VII coverage for non sex-
stereotypical behavior simply because the person is transsexual. As
such, discrimination against a plaintiff who is a transsexual - and
therefore fails to act and/or identify with his or her gender - is no
different from the discrimination directed against Anne Hopkins in
Price Waterhouse who, in sex stereotypical terms, did not act like a
52
woman.
The Sixth Circuit denied en banc review and last year reaffirmed
this analysis in the case of Barnes v. City of Cincinnati." This time a
police officer, denied a promotion while on probation for a sergeant
position, was a preoperative male to female transsexual. The plaintiff
survived pretrial motions and won a jury verdict. The Sixth Circuit
panel found this case clearly controlled by Smith and affirmed the
order. Once again, the Sixth Circuit denied en banc review and, two
months ago, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Perhaps the Supreme Court is holding back from examining this
issue because so far only the Sixth Circuit has adopted this particular
reading of Title VII in cases involving transsexual plaintiffs,5 4 but
surely there is a massive circuit split at present, because the standing
precedents in many of the circuits that I mentioned earlier in my talk,
including the Seventh Circuit in the Ulane case and the Eighth Circuit
in the Sommers case, have denied Title VII protections to
transsexuals asserting sex discrimination claims.
The ultimate question for us, of course, is whether Title VII's
ban on sex discrimination is appropriately used in either of these lines
of cases. When Congress adopted Title VII, there was no specific
intent to ban sexual orientation or gender identity discrimination.
Subsequent amendments have been made to Title VII over the years
against a background of circuit case law hostile to sex discrimination
claims by these kinds of plaintiffs as well as a total absence of
Supreme Court precedent. There are thirty years of unsuccessful
legislative proposals to amend or supplement Title VII to ban sexual
orientation discrimination, and, as I mentioned, no member of
52. Id. at 574-75.
53. 401 F.3d 729, 733 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 624 (2005).
54. Since this talk, a federal trial judge in Pennsylvania (in the 3d Circuit) has followed the
6th Circuit's lead. Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm, Inc., No. Civ.A 05-243, 2006 WL 456173
(W.D. Pa. Feb, 17, 2006).
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Congress has even introduced a bill to ban gender identity
discrimination. In fact, to avoid extending such protection
inadvertently, Congress included a provision in the Americans with
Disabilities Act providing that neither homosexuality nor
transsexualism could be considered disabilities."
There are good theoretical arguments supporting the contention
that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and or gender
identity is sex discrimination. Sylvia Law and Andrew Kopelman
have argued these points persuasively in the law reviews.5 6 Courts
have not generally relied on those arguments expressly, instead
developing the two lines of cases that I've discussed based on an
expansive reading of Price Waterhouse. I agree with Justice Scalia,
which I rarely do, but I agree with Justice Scalia that "statutory
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably
comparable evils."5 7 And I contend that sexual orientation and gender
identity discrimination are reasonably comparable evils to sex
discrimination.
I think it is time for the federal courts to abandon the tortured
reasoning that Judge Posner described in his concurrence in Hamm
and to take Justice Scalia's advice, which seems akin to what British
Commonwealth Courts do when they read in civil rights protections
on analogous grounds to those specified in constitutional provisions
or statutes in order to vindicate their country's commitments to legal
equality. For example, Canada's Supreme Court reads in sexual
orientation to the charter of rights as an analogous ground for sex
discrimination. Although the Ninth Circuit has declared DeSantis
dead, at least to the extent that it rejected sex stereotyping as a
relevant consideration in construing Title VII, it is time to go beyond
that and overrule the EEOC's original determination that sexual
orientation discrimination is not sex discrimination. Such a ruling
would be a matter of statutory construction, so it would be subject to
overruling by Congress if Congress disagreed. Depending on the
outcome of this year's congressional elections, such a forthright ruling
might provoke Congress to amend Title VII to add yet another
clarifying amendment to explain what sex discrimination is. Of
55. Americans With Disabilities Act § 511, 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2000).
56. Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social
Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187.
57. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
58. Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 (Can.).
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course, how that would go, who could predict? Congress could just
move to cut short both lines of cases by overruling them, but I think
that is less likely to happen in light of the wide co-sponsorship that
the Employment Non-Discrimination Act now enjoys and the
extremely close vote that it received from the Senate in 1996.'9
Where these lines and cases will go, nobody knows. There's
turmoil in the circuits. There's reluctance in the Supreme Court.
There's the failure of Congress to address an issue even though the
door has been knocked on many times. I'm sure we'll have an
interesting discussion about this. Thank you.
Joan Chalmers Williams*: Good morning. I'm going to talk
about a new area, in the rapidly expanding area of employment
discrimination law, which we call family responsibilities
discrimination (FRD). When we think of sex discrimination, we tend
to think of glass ceiling discrimination and sexual harassment. But
there is an explosion of potential liability for family responsibilities
discrimination or maternal wall discrimination; those are the two
names for it. We have now found over 600 cases. There has been a
400 percent increase since 2000, a very sharp increase. Preliminary
research shows that there may be a higher win rate in these cases than
there are in other civil rights cases: 27 percent versus nearly 50
percent.o There are sixty-seven cases with verdicts and settlements
over one hundred thousand dollars.6' The highest one is $11.65
million, Chris Schultz, in 2002.62
What about litigation of these cases? We at the Center for
59. S.2056, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (failing 49-50 in the 1996 Senate vote, 142 Cong.
Rec. S.10,129-S.10,139 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996)). In 1996, as part of a deal to pass the Defense
of Marriage Act without a battle over floor amendments, the Senate leaders agreed to bring the
then-current version of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act to the floor for an up-or-down
vote. It fell just one vote short of the tie that would have given Vice President Al Gore the
opportunity to cast a deciding vote in favor of the first passage of a pro-gay discrimination bill in
the history of either chamber of Congress.
* Distinguished Professor of Law and Founding Director, Center for WorkLife Law,
University of California, Hastings College of Law.
60. Mary C. Still, Demography of the Maternal Wall, Working Paper, Center for WorkLife
Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, (forthcoming 2006), available at
<http://www/worklifelaw.org>.
61. Joan C. Williams & Cynthia Thomas Calvert, Family Responsibilities Discrimination:
What Plaintiffs' Attorneys, Management Attorneys and Employees Need to Know, 91 WOMEN
LAWS. J. 24, 25 (2006).
62. Schultz v. Advocate Health & Hosps., No. 01C-0702, 2002 WL 31941430 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
30, 2002); Dee McAree, Family Leave Suit Draws Record $11.65M Award, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 11,
2002 ($11,650,000 jury award for wrongful termination of male hospital maintenance employee
who took a leave of absence under the Family Medical Leave Act to care for his elderly
parents.)
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WorkLife Law run an Attorney Network, in which we work with
attorneys who are litigating these cases and provide a hotline for
moms and others experiencing FRD at work. What we found, that
gave rise to that network, is that a lot of FRD cases were being lost
because they were being litigated in ways that were flawed. A lot of
them, for example, were filed under the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act (PDA),6 3 and the allegation was discrimination against new
mothers. Well, the PDA doesn't cover new mothers. 4 So, really the
key conceptual issue is how you frame the cases. If you frame them
as requiring accommodation, you will also lose. Title VII does not
require employers to accommodate mothers' "special needs." 65 In the
context of accommodation, as we see from cases under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), courts assume that this is going to cost
employers a lot of money, and they are very reluctant to do that.
What we have argued is that these cases should not be framed as
accommodation cases; they are straight line discrimination cases.
Workplace ideals are designed around men's bodies - after all it is
only women who have babies - and men's life patterns - American
women still do roughly 80 percent of the child care.66 So, if you design
good jobs around men's bodies and men's life patterns, that is just sex
discrimination. That is not a demand for special treatment; that is a
request to eliminate discrimination.
When you design good jobs around men, a lot of stereotypes
arise in every day interactions because the underlying norm is a
masculine norm. So you have to deal with this design as an issue of
discrimination, not accommodation.
It is also very important in litigating these cases to show that the
plaintiff had positive evaluations before and after she had children, so
that it was the employer's perception of the plaintiff that changed, not
her job commitment or performance. I will talk later about the role
of stereotyping - recognizing the implicit stereotypes and diffusing
63. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000)).
64. See, e.g., Piantanida v. Wyman Center, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 1226, 1235 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(plaintiff's status as a "new mother" is not a protected trait under the PDA).
65. These "special needs" often take the form of a request for a child-rearing leave of
absence. See Roberts v. U.S. Postmaster Gen., 947 F. Supp. 282, 288 (E.D. Tex. 1996)
(collecting cases).
66. JOAN WILLIAMS ET AL., WORKLIFE LAW, ENDING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
FAMILY CAREGIVERS 7 (2004) (citing Liana C. Sayer & Suzanne M. Bianchi, Women's
Economic Independence and the Probability of Divorce: A Review and Re-examination, 21 J.
FAM. ISSUES 906 (2000)), available at <http://www.uchastings.edu/site-files/VLL/Caregiver
DiscriminationReport.pdf> (last visited Apr. 24, 2006).
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them before they take hold.
As we all know, and as the new institutionalists are studying,
what is important is not litigation, but the threat of litigation; that is
what produces social change. As the result of the center for WorkLife
Law's first report on FRD where we had roughly twenty-five cases,
one management-side law firm advised employers to review
personnel policies and survey employees to make sure that there was
no family responsibilities discrimination going on. The advice
included to: consider prorating at least some benefits for part time
employees, consider permitting flexible schedules and/or tele-
commuting, consider setting up leave banks, avoid questioning
applicants and employees about their family situations or child
bearing plans, and not to make assumptions or use stereotypes.67
What is fascinating about this list from the perspective of the new
institutional list literature is that it mixes up what is absolutely
prohibited by the four corners of the law of treating men and women
differently with things that are way outside of where the case law was
then - such as part-time equity and allowing telecommuting and
flexible schedules. There is no logical distinction being made between
the two and this is from the management-side, not the employee side.
Why is this happening? The new institutionalism provides a lot
of insight. First of all, think about what management-side lawyers do.
I work with both plaintiff and management-side lawyers. My
organization very consciously hires both. Many management-side
lawyers really see their work as a mix of human resources advice and
legal advice. Employers often go beyond the four corners of the law
because it decreases uncertainty and maximizes legitimacy. For
example, an EEO officer of a large cultural institution told me that a
female employee had come to her and said that after she had
children, she was required to work longer hours and was not getting
any good work. And what the EEO officer did was simply take a copy
of our 2003 law review article on the material wall 8 to the head of
HR, and the woman's situation changed overnight.
67. HRhero.com, Discrimination; A glass ceiling for parents? (M. Lee Smith Publishers
LLC, 2002), available at <http://www.hrhero.com/pregnancy/parents-print.html> (last visited
Apr. 24, 2006) (citing the initial report, Joan Williams & Nancy Segal, Families that Work, The
Program on Gender, Work & Family, American University, Washington College of Law
(August 2002)).
68. Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family
Caregivers Who are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 77 (2003).
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This story - one of many we hear - highlights another point from
the new institutionalism: the important role of intermediaries. In a
sense, it is not lawyers who make changes on the ground; it is
intermediaries like human resources professionals. Corporate counsel
also have the potential to play a large role in this change; after all,
many people leave law firms to go in-house because of work-family
reasons. For example, when I was running a meeting of Chicago
employment lawyers and told one prominent lawyer from a
management-side firm about one of the early FRD cases, she said,
"Why don't I know about that case?" She was clearly interested, and
she was a mom.
What we find in these cases is a new role emerging for
stereotyping evidence. As we all know, the traditional way for
proving disparate treatment under Title VII is by use of a
comparator. But one stunning 2004 case, Back v. Hastings on
Hudson,6 9 actually cited our work describing maternal wall
stereotyping and held that an alternative way to prove disparate
treatment in the absence of a comparator is by using evidence of
gender stereotyping.0 Back involved a school psychologist who was
told, "This is no job for someone with little ones." She was denied
tenure because of the assumption that, because she had kids, she
would not continue to work hard after she got tenure. She actually
lost at trial, but, nonetheless, the holding is there, that even without a
comparator, a plaintiff can prove disparate treatment based on
stereotyping evidence.
Another decisions authored by Richard Posner, Lust v. Sealy
Mattress1 was really, I think, a breakthrough because it held that
attribution bias - one form of so-called "subtle" bias - could be
evidence of gender stereotyping.72 That was one of the first times in
which cognitive bias was cited as evidence of stereotyping.
Now, why do we see what I consider to be a breakthrough in
cases that involve FRD? These are cases that involve motherhood.
There is also another phenomenon that I call cherchez la fille - look
69. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004) (school
psychologist denied tenure).
70. Id. at 118, 122.
71. Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2004).
72. Id. at 583 ("It would have been easy enough for Penters to ask Lust whether she was
willing to move to Chicago rather than assume she was not and by so assuming prevent her from
obtaining a promotion that she would have snapped up had it been offered to her.").
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for the daughter. What happened to Rehnquist in Hibbs?" Partly
plaintiff's attorney Nina Pollard who hit him with a brilliant
argument, but he may have also been motivated in part by his family
experience. He had a daughter who was a single mom, and he left the
court early on some days to pick up his grandchildren.74 Look for the
daughter in these cases. These powerful conservative men often have
daughters who have experienced maternal wall discrimination, and
they are not amused.
What are the maternal wall patterns of stereotyping? Much of
this comes from a real landmark, the 2004 Journal of Social Issues
called "The Maternal Wall,"7 the first volume describing this type of
discrimination and establishing for the first time that motherhood is
one of the key triggers for gender discrimination. First, jobs are often
defined around masculine patterns. Good jobs in the United States
tend to require an immunity from household work that most mothers
do not have but many fathers do. As a consequence, 95 percent of
mothers aged twenty-five to forty-four with school-aged children at
home, work less then fifty hours per week, year round.76 That means
that all an employer has to do is define "full time" as fifty or more
hours per week and it has come close to wiping all mothers, and
therefore 75 percent of women, out of its labor pool. That is an
extremely important statistic.
Another type of maternal wall stereotyping is role incongruity,
which we see all the time in the cases. "Do you want to have babies
or do you want a career here?"- a question actually asked a three
million dollar jury verdict, later reduced. There is also benevolent
73. Nev. Dep't. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724 (2003) (holding that the
Congress had the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity from suit in federal court in the
Family Medical Leave Act because the Act was designed to remedy sex discrimination under
the Fourteenth Amendment).
74. See Linda Greenhouse, Heartfelt Words from the Rehnquist Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 6,
2003, §4, at 3 (attributing Chief Justice Rehnquist's views in Hibbs to the fact that "his daughter,
Janet, is a single mother who until recently held a high-pressure job and sometimes had child-
care problems. Several times this term, the seventy-eight-year-old Chief Justice of the United
States left work early to pick up his granddaughters from school.").
75. Symposium, The Maternal Wall: Research and Policy Perspectives on Discrimination
Against Mothers, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 665 (2004).
76. U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey: 2006 March Supplement, Data
generated by Mary C. Still for the Center for WorkLife Law, using the DataFerrett, available at
<http://dataferrett.census.gov/TheDataWeb/index.html> (Files generated Apr. 25, 2006).
77. Ann Belser, Mommy Track Wins; $3 Million Awarded to Mom Denied Promotion,
PITISBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 30, 1999, at B1 (discussing Hallberg case against Avistech
Chemical Corp.).
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prescriptive stereotyping, as in the Trezza case.7 ' An outstanding
lawyer was not offered a promotion when the employer assumed that
she would not want to travel because she was a mom.
Another type of maternal wall stereotyping is attribution bias.
An absent man is assumed to be at a business meeting; an absent
woman is assumed to be home with her children. We have actual
lawyer interviews to that effect with one lawyer saying that because of
stereotyping, she no longer received good performance evaluations
after she went part-time.
Leniency bias is another. A new study shows that mothers are
held to longer hours and higher performance and punctuality
standards. 9 The good news for some of the people in the room is that
fathers are actually held to lower hours and lower performance and
punctuality standards.o An example of leniency bias is denying light
duty to pregnant women while allowing it liberally to men for their
short-term disabilities, like back injuries. You apply an objective rule
rigorously to the out group and leniently to the in group.
Then there are negative competence assumptions. Again, the
same recent study showed that, relative to other kinds of applicants,
mothers were rated as less competent, less committed, less suitable
for higher promotion and management training, and deserving of
lower salaries." Which reminds me of something a Boston lawyer
said: "Since I came back from maternity leave, I get the work of a
paralegal. I want to say, look, I had a baby, not a lobotomy."8 2 There
is another set of studies, done by Fiske and Glick, that showed that
business women are actually rated as very high in competence, similar
to business men; housewives, on the other hand, are rated alongside
the most stigmatized groups, the elderly, blind, "retarded," and
78. Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., No. 98 CIV. 2205 (MBM),1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20206 at **
11, 18, 23 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1998) (granting employer's motion for summary judgment in part
where employee failed to present evidence sufficient to show hostile work environment sexual
harassment and disparate impact discrimination and denying summary judgment in part where
plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory failure to
promote).
79. Shelley J. Correll & Stephan Benard, Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty?
23 (Aug. 15, 2005) (unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of the American
Sociological Association, currently under review for publication).
80. Id. at 23, 26.
81. Id.
82. JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 69 (2000); Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall:
Relief for Family Caregivers who are Discriminated against on the Job., 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
77, 77 (2003).
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disabled." The lawyer left a business woman and came back a
housewife. That, of course, leads to a lot of disparate treatment.
It is important to recognize that maternal wall stereotyping often
pits women against women. One example is the Walsh case,' which is
a hostile environment case. In that case, the hostile treatment was
toward a woman whose child had many, many ear infections, for
which she had to take her child to the pediatrician. The interesting
thing is that the harassment came from a supervisor who was also a
woman, and who had a child with the same problem." Perhaps the
supervisor was trying to prove that, "I had this problem and I didn't
inconvenience anybody." So, these cases are very complicated,
psychologically.
And then you have conflicts between mothers and childless or
childfree women who "forgot" to have kids. Of course, they didn't
forget to have kids; just having children was incompatible with their
career path. Why should she have it all? I didn't? Childfree women
are often cultural entrepreneurs, trying to invent a new imagery of a
full, adult female life without kids, and may fear that mothers are just
reinforcing negative stereotypes about women and work. It is very
important in analyzing these cases to recognize that the maternal wall
pits women against women, when it is evidence of gender
discrimination, not proof that it doesn't exist.
FRD also occurs against fathers. A study of over 500 employees
found that, when compared to mothers, dads who took a parental
leave were recommended for fewer rewards and were viewed as less
committed. Fathers who even took a short work absence due to a
family conflict were recommended for fewer rewards and had lower
performance ratings, So that silver lining I mentioned earlier
appears to disappear." The bottom line for dads seems to be that if
83. Susan T. Fiske et al., A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype Content: Competence and
Warmth Respectively Follow From Perceived Status and Competition, 82 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 872, 879 (2002).
84. Walsh v. Nat'l Computer Sys., Inc., 332 F.3d 1150 (8th Cir. 2003).
85. Oral Comments by Jim Kaster, Plaintiff Shireen Walsh's Attorney, at the New Glass
Ceiling Conference, Washington College of Law, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 24, 2003) (transcript
available from American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & Law).
86. Christine E. Dickson, The Impact of Family Supportive Policies and Practices on
Perceived Family Discrimination (2003) (unpublished dissertation, California School of
Organizational Studies, Alliant International University) (on file with authors).
87. Id.
88. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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you do a little, you are a prince; if you do a lot, you are a wimp.
Courts have begun to recognize that maternal wall pattern
stereotyping is common. We have an incredible quote from Hibbs,
which I think is right from the Pollard brief: "The fault line between
work and family is precisely where sex based generalization has been
and remains the strongest."89 In Back v. Hastings, the court said, "It
takes no special training to discern stereotyping in the view that a
woman cannot be a good mother and have a job that requires long
hours, or in a statement that a mother who received tenure would not
show the same level of commitment because she had little ones at
home."" The court in Back, like Price Waterhouse, was very careful
to send the signal that you do not need expert testimony to prove
stereotyping, which, of course, is extremely important for plaintiffs.
There is also this recognition in a state case, Sivieri,9 ' which
involved a woman who worked in the state prison system. "Taken as
true, these allegations established a bias against women with young
children predicated on the stereotypical belief they are incapable of
doing an effective job, while at the same time caring for their young
children." 92 So, the Supreme Court, circuit courts and state courts are
all beginning to accept maternal wall stereotyping evidence in family
responsibilities discrimination cases.
At this point, the Center for WorkLife Law has identified
seventeen legal theories that have been used successfully in FRD
cases. Employers never say, "we do not want women here," but they
say, "we do not want moms here" every day of the week. That is one
of the reasons that plaintiffs in these cases are winning in an
avalanche. You can read the amazing things employers say when it
comes to mothers - I call them "jaw droppers."
Another form of disparate treatment is refusal to hire; for
example, a firefighter's interview consisted of questions about how
she was going to handle child care and how unreasonable it was to
apply for the job.93 Failure to promote cases are also very common, as
are termination cases and sudden changes in working conditions, -
transfer to a less desirable job, decrease in employment evaluations,
89. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 723 (2003).
90. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 120 (2d Cir. 2004).
91. Sivieri v. Dept. of Transitional Assistance, No. CA022233H, 16 Mass. L. Rptr. 531, 2003
WL 21781403 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 26, 2003).
92. Id. at *3.
93. Senuta v. City of Groton, No. 3:01-CV-475 (JCH), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10792, at *6
(D.Conn. Mar. 5, 2002).
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lower quality of work assignments.
This is not just a problem for rich women. The maternal wall
affects all parts of the economy. For example, in the current sex
discrimination laws suit against WalMart,94 one of the requirements
was that you had to move all the time to get promotions.95 There is
absolutely no business justification for this; they have stores every
three feet. Obviously this would have a disparate impact on women.
There is research that shows that women are less able than men to
move for their jobs, so when Wal-Mart uses that rule as part of the
classification process for getting promoted, it will obviously hurt
women disproportionately. Of course, you also see statistics used in
disparate treatment cases, going back to Trezza again.96
Another really important point in these cases, is who is the
appropriate comparator. As the plaintiff, do not compare men to
women; compare mothers to others, because if you look around in
many good jobs you will often get the inexorable zero if you compare
mothers to others. Trezza is a good example. There were forty-six
managing attorneys in the Hartford Insurance Company's Eastern
District. Not one was a woman with school-aged children.7
There are other Title VII theories, for example the hostile work
environment case I mentioned earlier, by the women whose child had
persistent ear infections, Walsh v. National Computer Systems.98 The
supervisor eventually, allegedly, threw a phone book at the plaintiff,
told her to find a new pediatrician open after hours and told her,
"You'd better not get pregnant again."99
But even that hostile work environment does not top the
constructive discharge case of Bergstrom-Ek v. Best Oil Co."1 The
pregnant employee's supervisor kept trying to convince her to have
94. See Dukes v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 142 (D. Cal. 2004) (certifying a
nationwide class of women who have been subjected to WalMart's pay and promotions policies
to consist of "[a]l1 women employed at any WalMart domestic retail store at any time since
December 26, 1998 who have been or may be subjected to WalMart's challenged pay and
management track promotions policies and practices").
95. See id. at 148, 152 (stating that to be eligible for promotion, a candidate had to be
willing to relocate and the average store manager is transferred 3.6 times after achieving that
position).
96. Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., No. 98 CIV. 2205 (MBM),1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20206 at **
11, 18, 23 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1998).
97. Id. at *3.
98. 332 F.3d 1150 (8th Cir. 2003).
99. Id. at 1155.
100. 153 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 1998).
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an abortion and threatened to push her down the stairs. 01 She won
that case.
Another amazing case is Washington v. Illinois Department of
Revenue.10 2 A woman complained of race discrimination. In
retaliation, her employer allegedly took away her seven a.m. to three
p.m. schedule and insisted that she work the outlandish schedule of
nine to five.103 According to conservative Judge Easterbrook, taking
away her flexible schedule was an adverse employment action
because she had a son with Down's syndrome so, for her, that
schedule was very important.104
There are also cases under ERISA and the ADA. The ERISA
cases are very important, in my opinion, although under-developed.
Can you conceive of a situation where an employer risks losing the
tax benefits of ERISA? ADA association cases are also a possibility
in this area. One employer hired every single person when they took
over another company except for a mother with a disabled kid.o
Of course, there are many Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA) cases involving not only denial of leave, but also
interference with leave, which as Martin Malin has pointed out, is a
very powerful provision of the FMLA. 06 Another amazing case is an
Equal Pay Act (EPA) case, actually litigated by a former student of
mine. The jury awarded $900,000, later reduced, to a woman who
worked part-time. She was a chemist who was paid a lower wage rate
than the full-time men were,"o' an obvious violation of the EPA.
Some closing thoughts: If there is a chilly climate for mothers,
there is a frigid climate for fathers. Also, people keep saying you
cannot litigate part-time; it just isn't true. You can litigate flexible
schedules, as the Washington case has shown us."a Family
responsibilities discrimination is a very important, growing trend that
workers, employers, attorneys, intermediaries and academics should
all understand. In a context in which the total number of federal
101. Id. at 854-55.
102. 420 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. 2005).
103. Id. at 659.
104. Id.
105. Abdel-Khalek v. Ernst & Young, No. 97 Civ. 4514 (JGK), 1999 WL 190790 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 5, 1999, as amended Apr. 7, 1999).
106. See Martin H. Malin, Interference With the Right to Leave Under the Family and
Medical Leave Act, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 329 (2003).
107. Lovell v. BBNT Solutions, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 2d 611, 615-17 (2003).
108. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying.
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employment discrimination lawsuits is decreasing, FRD cases are on
the rise. The concepts of the maternal wall and family responsibilities
discrimination should be included in employment law casebooks and
courses throughout the country.
The question that remains is can the success in the use of
stereotyping evidence in family responsibilities discrimination cases
be leveraged into other types of discrimination and cases? Also, from
a theoretical point of view, FRD cases provide insights into the really
complex process by which legal change fuels institutional and
normative change. Finally, there is the old essentialism issue. People
have said, "Oh well, litigation only helps rich women." Well you have
seen the cases; that is not true. Grocery clerks, police women,
executives, all the way up and down the economic spectrum, they all
hit the maternal wall. Thank you.
Professor Miriam A. Cherry*: Thank you so much. Good
morning everyone, and thanks to Michelle and to everybody for a
great panel so far.
We have been talking about sex stereotyping theory at work. I
want to shift from case law, and instead talk about how some of the
stereotypes have been created and perpetuated. I have been doing
some work on women in popular culture, women in film and women
workers in film, and so I thought this would be a good opportunity to
talk about some of those stereotypes and how they have been
changing over time.
Now, we are lucky in the employment and labor law area to have
some great films out there. What I am focusing on is the way the sex
stereotypes are created and perpetuated in popular culture.
Basically, the way I came to look at this is that for sex stereotypes of
the kind that we have been talking about earlier in the panel to exist,
they have to have some currency. And so, in a sense, what we are
talking about with images of women, women workers, in film
specifically, is a recursive or feedback relationship between the two.
Employees, in a sense, have a performative aspect to their work. In
some of the feminist literature and post-modern literature in this
109. See e.g., Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Facts and Figures, tbl. 4.4
"U.S. District Courts, Civil Cases Filed by Nature of Suit," p. 2, available at <http://wwwl
uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigure/Table404.pdf> (last visited Apr. 25, 2006) (reporting a steady
decline in the number of federal civil rights employment cases filed from 21,157 in FY2001 to
16,930 in FY2005).
* Assistant Professor of Law, Samford University, Cumberland School of Law;
Appointed as Professor of Law, University of the Pacific-McGeorge School of Law.
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area, by Judith Butler and some of the other theorists,o they talk
about this performative aspect to gender roles, how people are
performing a type of script based on sort of what they see as
appropriate for men and women. It gets carried out in the workplace.
We then see images of women workers in film, and then people
internalize with what they see, and that gets carried out in the
workplace yet again.
I have decided to focus on specifically labor and employment law
related movies and images of women workers in these movies. What
I am arguing today is that some of the images and some of the
stereotypes that we see are actually changing over time, and I am
going to leave the panel on, I hope, a positive note that I think some
of these things are actually moving in a positive direction and are
giving us another way of looking at women, perhaps as agents of
social change within the workplace.
In any event, I will say that it does seem that we have so many
stereotypes, so little time, and I am going to be showing two clips
today to illustrate some of the points that I am talking about. But
essentially, I have watched a number of labor and employment law
movies, and although I do not have the time to show you all of these,
there is a rich group of them out there at this point.
Women workers are stereotyped first as sex objects within the
workplace; second, as office girls with their competence being
constantly questioned or being seen in a stereotypical role in very
gender segregated workplaces. Another stereotype is the invisible
woman worker. Now this is a little hard to illustrate. I will describe a
couple of movies where I think the lack of women workers is
noticeable. Women are also seen as temporary workers. This is a
more dominant trend, I think, within looking at employment
relationships as being more transitory, more temporary, but we see
this played out especially in regard to women workers or how they
are being portrayed in film. After I discuss these various stereotypes
that are out there, I will give a few examples of each and of how they
have been changing over time. Then I want to talk about the counter-
story to all these negative stereotypes, which is women as agents of
change and, hopefully, leave us on a positive note.
The first stereotype is women workers as sex objects, being there
for decoration, being there simply as sort of window dressing.
110. E.g., Judith Butler, Imitation and Gender Insubordination, in THE JUDITH BUTLER
READER 119 (Sarah Salih & Judith Butler eds., 2004).
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Perhaps this image is more relevant to some of the earlier movies that
we see right after Title VII. "How to Succeed in Business Without
Really Trying""' was originally a musical the same year as Title VII,
and was released as a movie in 1967. The entire movie is a satire of
American business, but in a loving and admiring way. It details
throughout the entire movie the rise of a window washer, J. Pierpont
Finch, from the bottom rung of the corporate ladder all the way to the
top, as CEO. In a lot of ways there are questions of nepotism that are
raised throughout the movie and, in particular in this clip, what I am
going to show you is that the big boss' girlfriend has just been hired as
a secretary to work in the company.
Hedy LaRue is the boss' girlfriend and also the new secretary.
There are some male executives who try to get in on a pool for her to
be their actual secretary. They launch into a rendition of a song
called, "A Secretary Is Not a Toy.""2 What you can see from the
costumes and the way Hedy was positioning herself and walking, is an
illustration of the point that I was making. In this movie, women are
generally perceived as sex objects. Almost completely in the movie,
they are not taken seriously as business people at all, and the later
part where they sing this anthem, "This Noble Brotherhood of Man,"
the executive core is entirely male, and the group of secretaries is
entirely female, a completely segregated workforce at that time.
Now, part of what you want to do when you see this clip, and it is
even worse if you hear the song, is that you want to get on the phone
and call the EEOC - help, look at what is going on in this workplace.
Also, within the movie, the other thing that you see is that sexual
harassment is being treated as if it is a good-natured fun game that
happens. Nobody in the movie really gets hurt by it. It is not
something that is seen as awful or actionable, and that goes with the
time it was released. We are talking about 1967. That is before
Williams v. Saxbe,"3 MeTitor Savings Bank,"4 and the rest of the cases
that established the sexual harassment cause of action. So, clearly we
are at a time period where this is just seen as good-natured office fun.
Women are seen as sexual objects, and nobody really complains.
Fast forward another twelve years and look at the office comedy
111. How TO SUCCEED IN BUSINESS WITHOUT REALLY TRYING (MGM 1967).
112. FRANK LOESSER, A Secretary is Not a Toy, on How TO SUCCEED IN BUSINESS
WITHOUT REALLY TRYING (RCA 2000) (1961).
113. 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir.
1978).
114. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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"Nine to Five.".. In this movie, we get another example of sexual
harassment where Doralee, who is a secretary played by Dolly
Parton, is sexually harassed at her workplace. Here it is not just
treated as good-natured fun. She actually is upset about this behavior,
and the group of women office workers, again an entirely female
clerical staff, decides to take revenge on their boss. Part of how
Doralee gets back at her boss is to fantasize revenge against him,
which gets us to the old adage, I take revenge against my enemies by
doing things to them in my fantasies. But, in any event, the dynamic
has changed because, in the revenge fantasy that she has, she chases
her boss around the desk and harasses him. Again it is a fantasy, and
it is done for comedic purposes, but the point is that it is being done
to make a point that women are angry about harassment.
And now if you look to 2005, with the recent movie "North
Country," 116 which is the dramatization of the Eveleth Mines case,
Josey Aimes, played by Charlize Theron, tries to use the legal system
to remedy the harassment. Here harassment is not a joke or viewed
as an extra-legal element where we are going to get revenge on
somebody through our fantasies. Instead, here we see workers using
the legal system to try to vindicate their rights.
The second category of stereotype is the "office girl." Has
anyone else noticed, by the way, that we seem to be back to this
terminology of "girls" in the office? I thought this had died a painful
death some years ago, and yet I seem to hear it all the time. I hear it
from students, and I hear it when people talk about their workplaces.
It is the idea of infantilizing people in the workplace and attacking
their competence, and this gets back to the negative competence
assumptions that we were talking about earlier in the panel.
The movie "Working Girl""' came out in the late 1980s. It
features some fantastically bad '80s fashions and large hair. It also
features Melanie Griffith as Tess McGill, who is an '80s Wall Street
secretary. She is able to take on the role of her boss and put together
this fantastic mergers and acquisitions deal. But when she presents
her winning idea to the executives of the company, she walks into an
entirely all male business setting - she is the only woman present in
the board room - and she is lauded for this great idea that she has
had. But at the same time, the boss talks down to her. He essentially
115. NINE TO FIVE (20th Century Fox 1980).
116. NORTH COUNTRY (Warner Brothers 2005).
117. WORKING GIRL (20th Century Fox 1988).
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says this to the CEO of the acquiring company, and says to Tess,
"This is just like that wonderful story about the child who was able to
save this truck from an underpass by letting the air out of the tires;
you're just like that child."
So, here we have a moment of triumph. It is a Cinderella story
that, surprisingly, is not nabbing the man, but actually nabbing the
job. It seemed to have this great plot line, but then it actually turns
out that our heroine, with whom we are supposed to sympathize, is
being compared to a child. In a sense it is a Cinderella story, because
for a woman like Tess to really be able to succeed in the business
world would practically take a fairy godmother or other type of a
miracle, because in the beginning of the movie she is not given any
mentoring or any help to succeed. It is actually the opposite; she is
sexually harassed by various people in positions of power in the
brokerage house. So, it would really take something extra to get her
to the point that we see at the end, where she is successful.
The third category that I would like to talk about is the invisible
or temporary woman worker. Now, again, it is really hard to show
how women are excluded from the various workplaces in film
because, de facto, by my title they are not there, but in this vein is
"Office Space,"118 which is a funny take on some issues in terms of
layoffs, promotions, performance, all sorts of workplace issues. It has
some biting satirical humor, and there is this moment of angry men
taking out a hapless piece of office equipment with some hammers,
and it is actually very amusing to see this. It is all set to the tune of
gangster rap. But the point is, at this software company, there are no
women working, and you have this angry male moment, but you will
assume that if women were present in this workplace they would have
an angry moment as well, but they are not even there to have it.
As an example of temporary women workers, or the view of
women as being temporary in film, I would point to the movie
"Clockwatchers."11 9 This is a movie that deals with four temporary
clerical workers who occupy the bottom rung of the corporate ladder,
and as the title of the movie implies, they are waiting for time to go
by. As they wait for time to pass they are constantly worried that
they are going to lose their jobs. They are constantly worried that
they are going to be reassigned, but that is the nature of their work.
One of them talks about her temporary assignment at a bank and she
118. OFFICE SPACE (20th Century Fox 1999).
119. CLOCKWATCHERS (Goldcrest Films, Ltd. 1997).
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says, "I used to work in a bank. There was this button on the desk
and I just kept looking at it every day for a month, so finally I pushed
it. Well, it was the alarm, but they never tell you anything because
they're just afraid you're going to steal their job."
I think that dialogue is demonstrating a larger issue that many
people have been writing about and talking about, which is the
question of the more transitory and more contingent nature of
work.120 So, this is illustrated in this particular movie and it happens
to be four female coworkers who are engaged in these discussions.
We talked about the sexual objectification of women, how
women are being viewed as invisible, temporary, and just office girls.
Rather than leave the talk on that note, because I think we really are
moving in a more positive direction, there is this counter-story to
some of the dominant stereotypes. The counter-story started with the
movie "Norma Rae, "121 which I think we all have as sort of as central
in the canon if we are looking at plucky movie heroines. In that
movie, Norma Rae is able to take this central role, standing up to
various male authority figures, to organize a union at the mill, along
with some outsiders. Meanwhile, she is criticized for her
unconventional lifestyle, the fact that she has a child out of wedlock,
the fact that she has a number of boyfriends whom she is involved
with. That is the first movie, but there are a number of other
employment law movies that I would classify as having a strong
female character who is showing the way, perhaps, for a change in
some of these stereotypes we have been talking about. Not only do
we have Norma Rae, but we also have Maya, who is the young
woman in "Bread and Roses,"1 22 who takes an almost identical role to
Norma Rae. She is a young Mexican worker who organizes other
janitors within the building to go on strike. I am also thinking of
Meryl Streep, who played Karen Silkwood; 1 23 Julia Roberts, who
played Erin Brokovich;1 2 4 and Charlize Theron, again most recently in
the movie "North Country."12 5
To conclude, while in general there is a feedback loop that shows
women workers in employment movies as either sex objects,
120. See, e.g., KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGETS: EMPLOYMENT
REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE (2005).
121. NORMA RAE (20th Century Fox 1979).
122. BREAD AND ROSES (Lions Gate 2000).
123. SILKWOOD (20th Century Fox, ABC Motion Pictures 1983).
124. ERIN BROKOVICH (Universal Pictures 2000).
125. NORTH COUNTRY, supra note 110.
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incompetent girls, invisible, or temporary, at the same time, there is
another line of movies that I think stands directly in opposition to
some of these negative stereotypes. In this line of movies, there are
strong working class women, often with a class consciousness, who
not only go up against these stereotypes, but actively work to shatter
those stereotypes. So, although the overall portrayal of women
workers in employment films may still be centered on the stereotypes,
I think that in many ways, there is a blueprint for changing them and
women workers will instead be stereotype breakers rather then
stereotype makers. Thank you all very much.
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